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CORPORATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
 
Robert E. Wagner* 
Abstract 
For well over half a century, the legal system has chosen to exclude 
some of the most probative evidence possible from criminal trials when 
the government obtained the evidence in contravention of the Fourth 
Amendment. This policy of exclusion is based more on a perceived 
greater need to protect U.S. citizens from governmental abuses than to 
convict every criminal. Meanwhile, during the same time period in which 
courts have excluded this evidence, the government has consistently 
increased the level of criminal enforcement against corporations. The 
government regularly promotes the idea that corporations are dangerous 
if left unchecked, and as a result a strong need for criminal prosecutions, 
new laws, and increased penalties exists. Therefore, on the one hand, the 
government has increased its pursuit of criminal corporations, and on the 
other hand, courts exclude from prosecutions the evidence most likely to 
lead to convictions.  
This Article examines the possible tension between these two policies. 
The examination begins with an overview of the ways in which the law 
treats corporations as “people” in court and entitles them to constitutional 
rights. It continues with the ways in which corporate criminal 
prosecutions have arisen and the ways in which courts currently conduct 
them. This Article then studies the so-called exclusionary rule and its 
origins as a judicial doctrine that seeks to protect the rights granted under 
the Fourth Amendment. This Article’s argument demonstrates that 
corporations may not be entitled to Fourth Amendment protection at all 
even though they currently receive it. As part of its analysis, this Article 
examines both the contemporary explanations and historical backdrop for 
the exclusionary rule. None of the traditional justifications for the 
exclusionary rule apply effectively to corporations. When it comes to 
deterrence, the costs of excluding reliable information are higher in the 
corporate setting than the individual setting, and the benefits are lower. 
This Article operates within the U.S. Supreme Court’s requirement that a 
court must conduct fact-specific cost–benefit analysis in every case to 
determine whether to exclude evidence, and this Article concludes that in 
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the vast majority of corporate criminal cases, the exclusionary rule should 
not apply. This Article proposes that courts should adopt a default rule 
that all reliable evidence should be admitted against corporate defendants 
regardless of its provenance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution establishes for all 
Americans the right to be secure in their persons and property from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.1 One of the primary ways in which 
this right is protected today is via the so-called exclusionary rule. This 
rule establishes that when the government has obtained evidence in an 
unconstitutional manner, a court will not allow the evidence to establish 
the guilt of or infringe upon the rights of an individual.2 This Article 
argues that the exclusionary rule should not apply with equal force to 
corporations as to natural people. In making this argument, this Article 
examines the distinctions between natural people and corporations, 
including information relating to corporate recidivism rates and the 
inherent limitations of corporate criminal penalties. This Article studies 
the history of both the Fourth Amendment itself and of the exclusionary 
rule, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in that area. The 
                                                                                                                     
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 2. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
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conclusion of this analysis is that the unique characteristics of a 
corporation and the different costs and benefits of excluding illegally 
obtained evidence from corporate prosecutions indicate that courts 
should not apply the rule in the traditional manner in these settings. This 
Article specifically argues that courts should allow reliable but 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence in criminal prosecutions against 
corporations. Meanwhile, courts should not use this same evidence 
against natural people also prosecuted in connection with the same 
criminal activity.  Further, courts should allow corporations to pursue any 
non-exclusion-based remedy available for the constitutional 
infringement.  
In Part I, this Article discusses the origins of and tensions inherent in 
corporate criminal liability. The relatively recent nature of this form of 
liability and the fictional nature of the corporation lead to special 
challenges when courts try to fit the doctrine into the general criminal 
law, including when they have to answer the question of whether to admit 
“tainted” evidence. This Part addresses the goals behind corporate 
prosecution and how best to accomplish them. Part II focuses on the 
exclusionary rule itself, its history, and the arguments for and against its 
use. Part III examines the applicability of the exclusionary rule in the 
corporate setting and concludes that while the Fourth Amendment applies 
to corporations, the exclusionary rule need not have the same application. 
This Part examines both the goal of deterrence, which courts have 
recognized to be the key purpose of the exclusionary rule, and other 
historical rationales for the rule to show that all of them support only a 
narrow application of the rule in the corporate setting. The conclusion of 
this Part presents a proposal to have a default prohibition against use of 
the exclusionary rule in the corporate setting if the government obtained 
reliable evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
I.  CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
This Part begins by exploring the origins of corporate criminal 
liability and the tensions inherent in the concept. It then examines the 
special challenges that the concept of corporate personhood create. 
Finally, this Part considers the purpose of corporate criminal liability and 
investigates how best to achieve the goals associated with corporate 
criminal liability. 
A.  The Framework of Corporate Criminal Liability 
Over a century ago, the debate began on both the existence and 
appropriate level of corporate criminal liability.3 Corporations were not 
                                                                                                                     
 3. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility in 
the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 411, 415 (2012); see also V.S. Khanna, Corporate 
Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1478 & n.2 (1996). 
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originally subject to the criminal law.4 Perhaps one of the most respected 
early legal scholars, William Blackstone, believed that the correctness of 
this state of affairs was so clear that it did not need to be elaborated upon.5 
In 1701, American courts addressed the question and held that only 
individuals could be charged criminally.6 Eventually, in the early part of 
the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court finally established 
corporate criminal liability in New York Central & Hudson River 
Railroad Co. v. United States7 and used the respondeat superior principle 
to determine guilt.8 A court can now hold a corporation criminally liable 
for almost any crime, except those requiring commission by a natural 
person,9 such as rape.10 Establishing that a court can hold a corporation 
criminally liable, however, did not end the debate. In fact, the issue may 
be more contentious today than ever before. The opponents of corporate 
criminal liability perceive the practice as an “inefficient relic” that can 
better achieve its goals in the civil system or, even worse, as a useless 
overreaction from an ignorant society.11 Others think that more corporate 
prosecutions would be appropriate, as evidenced by the Department of 
Justice’s increased focus on corporate crime.12 
Neither side of the debate claims that there has been no harm, but there 
is disagreement regarding who is responsible and who should suffer the 
consequences. What does it even mean to say that a corporation has 
committed a wrong? One possibility, which many have adopted, is to ask 
if someone with a high level of decision-making authority in the 
                                                                                                                     
 4. See Khanna, supra note 3, at 1479.  
 5. Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1363 (2009) (stating William Blackstone’s opinion that “[a] corporation 
cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime” (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *476)). 
 6. Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Liability, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 600, 601–02 (Gerben Bruinsma & David Weisburd eds., 2014). 
 7. 212 U.S. 481, 492–95 (1909). For a discussion of the case, see Erin Sheley, Perceptual 
Harm and the Corporate Criminal, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 225, 230–32 (2012). 
 8. N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 494 (imposing penalties on the corporation for an act committed 
by an employee on the premises).  
 9. A court has defined a natural person as “[a] human being, as distinguished from an 
artificial person created by law.” Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Precedent Cos., 782 N.E.2d 470, 476–77 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Natural Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999)). 
 10. Khanna, supra note 3, at 1488. 
 11. Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 
5 (2012) (footnote omitted). 
 12. See David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-prosecution Agreements and 
the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1309 (2013) (discussing the 
widely circulated Holder Memo, a guidebook for corporate liability). 
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corporation has done so.13 Shareholders have very little say in the 
management of their corporation while the true decision-making 
authority rests with the board, and other corporate officials accomplish 
most of the tactical day-to-day management.14 Therefore, opponents of 
corporate criminal liability argue that it would be appropriate to hold 
either the managers or employees liable for any criminal conduct, but not 
the entire corporation; they argue that it is unfair to punish the 
shareholders by imposing criminal penalties on the whole entity when 
only a small part may have engaged in wrongdoing.15 This point of view 
leads to the sentiment that people are the ones who commit crimes, not 
corporations.16 Thus, innocent shareholders and employees become 
“collateral damage” when courts impose criminal liability.17  
This was one of the main points raised in New York Central when the 
defendants argued that one punishes innocent shareholders when one 
punishes the corporation and that it was impossible for the corporation as 
an entity to commit a crime because the board (who is ultimately 
responsible for the decisions of a corporation) could not legally authorize 
criminal acts.18 This was not an unusual position because the idea that a 
corporation could not possess the moral blameworthiness necessary to 
perpetrate an intentional crime was a long-held belief.19 The Supreme 
Court rejected this position when it held that the purposes, motives, and 
intents of a corporation’s agents are also those of the corporation.20 Thus, 
the court established the tort law liability framework of respondeat 
superior as a viable criminal law theory. Yet, this new criminal 
application of an established tort principle quickly came under attack.21 
Many people felt that its use was inconsistent with the purpose of criminal 
law (namely the punishment of those who are morally blameworthy) 
because it does not rely on personal fault but instead is based upon 
vicarious guilt.22 Critics also attacked the use of respondeat superior to 
establish corporate criminal liability on the grounds that it was “overly 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See, e.g., Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 
1986). 
 14. Carol R. Goforth, “A Corporation Has No Soul”—Modern Corporations, Corporate 
Governance, and Involvement in the Political Process, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 617, 629–30 (2010). 
 15. See Miriam H. Baer, Organizational Liability and the Tension Between Corporate and 
Criminal Law, 19. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 5–6 (2010). 
 16. Brickey, supra note 6, at 601. 
 17. Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1359. 
 18. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492 (1909). 
 19. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME 
& JUSTICE 259, 259 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002). 
 20. N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 492–93 (quoting 1 BISHOP’S NEW CRIMINAL LAW § 417 (1892)). 
 21. See Khanna, supra note 3, at 1484.  
 22. Id. at 1484–85 (footnote omitted).  
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broad.”23 For example, it is possible in both the federal and state systems 
for a court to hold a corporation liable for the actions of any employee, 
even if the corporation instructed the employee specifically not to 
perform the action or even if the corporation was a victim.24 In fact, some 
corporate convictions do seem to have been based on individual actions, 
which results in disastrous results for the corporation, its employees, 
shareholders, and other stakeholders who were also adversely affected.25 
For example, the collapse of Arthur Andersen resulted in the loss of 
85,000 jobs and untold difficulties for not only those employees but also 
for people who relied on those employees or the services the company 
had provided and whose injuries the company did not rectify even though 
a court later reversed the conviction.26 
Multiple scholars argue that corporate criminal liability is unnecessary 
and in fact can lead to corporations spending more money avoiding crime 
than they should, which results in so-called overdeterrence.27 
Nonetheless, while corporations are almost unquestionably an essential 
part of modern life and bring many advantages, they also have the ability 
to cause great harm.28 A corporation can have as much coercive power as 
a government and occasionally even more.29 Large modern corporations 
are very similar to sovereignties; they often have more economic power 
than nations, they form alliances and partnerships with foreign nations, 
and some go so far as to have their own security forces.30 
In fact, corporations are without a doubt one of the most powerful 
institutions in the world. Governments are the only other possible 
contender for the most powerful institution, and in many situations 
corporations are more powerful than governments.31 Corporations have 
taken actions that have contributed to, if not caused, many types of 
disasters.32 Corporations can commit significantly larger and more 
                                                                                                                     
 23. Sheley, supra note 7, at 228, 236. 
 24. See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 970 (D.C. Cir. 
1998); United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 406–07 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 25. Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1367 (“The embarrassment of corporate criminal liability is 
that it punishes the innocent along with the guilty.”).  
 26. Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1364–66. 
 27. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 
321 (1996). 
 28. See, e.g., Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 3–4 (discussing the BP Gulf disaster as an 
exceptional instance of harmful corporate conduct). 
 29. Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of 
Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 891 (2011). 
 30. Id. at 949–50. 
 31. Goforth, supra note 14, at 618. 
 32. Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-dimensional Approach to 
the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 119 (2009). 
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damaging crimes because of their complexity, resources, and size.33 
Some of this increased harm is due to the “collective qualities” of 
corporations that amplify the potential harm caused.34 Criminalizing 
corporate behavior may also be appropriate due not only to the large 
amount of harm that corporations can cause, but also the specific chances 
for unlawful behavior that arise from corporations’ organizational 
structures.35 Some scholars also refer to the expressive value of punishing 
corporations and argue that because of societal perceptions, if the 
government fails to punish corporations, the criminal law may seem less 
legitimate.36 One view of the issue is that only individuals can bear moral 
responsibility,37 while another is that if a corporation fosters a culture that 
supports wrongdoing, then courts can and should use any actions by 
employees that result from its internal decision-making process to 
establish the corporation’s responsibility.38 
Some jurists conceive of corporations as mere legal fictions referring 
to those people and agreements that make up the organization; therefore, 
any liability should attach to these individuals.39 At the same time, this 
model of the corporation has received objections on numerous grounds, 
one of them being that corporations have cultures that are different from 
those of the individuals in them.40 Another problem with imposing 
criminal liability only upon the individuals is that, due to the nature of a 
large corporation and the possible complexity of its various hierarchies, 
determining which individual may have violated the law can be difficult, 
if not impossible.41  
Furthermore, the individuals alone may not be perpetrating, or at least 
not orchestrating, the criminal behavior; rather, it may be an actual 
business strategy or a simple standard operating procedure that creates 
the criminal behavior.42 Furthermore, a corporation’s customs or even its 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1484 (2009). 
 34. Sheley, supra note 7, at 228.  
 35. Joseph F.C. Dimento et al., Corporate Criminal Liability: A Bibliography, 28 W. ST. U. 
L. REV. 1, 2 (2001). 
 36. Sheley, supra note 7, at 227. 
 37. C. Soares, Corporate Versus Individual Moral Responsibility, 46 J. BUS. ETHICS 143, 
143 (2003). 
 38. John Hasnas, Managing the Risks of Legal Compliance: Conflicting Demands of Law 
and Ethics, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 507, 508 (2008).  
 39. Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 15. 
 40. See id. at 16. 
 41. Brickey, supra note 6, at 608–09. 
 42. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 33, at 1484 (discussing the engineering giant Siemens’ 
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culture can affect a person’s behavior and attitudes.43 If the legal system 
attributes the criminal behavior of corporations to the individual alone, it 
may disregard the institutional processes occurring within the 
organization that may have at least contributed to, if not caused, the 
criminal behavior.44 There are many relevant ways that corporate culture 
and organizational structure can influence individual decision-making.45 
It has been known for many years that a corporation’s policies can 
encourage criminal behavior.46 A notorious example of corporate 
misconduct inextricably tied to the character and culture of the 
corporation was the tobacco companies’ longstanding pattern of 
fraudulently misleading regulators and the public about the obvious and 
known health risks involved in smoking.47 In these types of situations, 
the proper question to ask is: What was it about that organization that 
caused people to act that way?48  
Another argument that scholars use to justify corporate criminal 
liability is that it allows the community to express its moral judgment.49 
If the government does not hold corporations criminally liable when 
people think it should, it is possible that it would weaken the criminal 
justice system because of appearances of favoritism and unequal 
application of the law.50 Perception could exacerbate this effect because 
people reportedly experience a heightened sense of moral indignation 
when dealing with a corporation than they do for a natural person, even 
when dealing with the same crime.51 Hence, there would be a situation in 
which people feel that the criminal justice system is functioning below 
the norm when it should actually function at a higher level than the 
norm.52 A final argument in favor of corporate criminal liability is 
                                                                                                                     
 43. Ripken, supra note 32, at 103. 
 44. Charles R.P. Pouncy, Reevaluating Corporate Criminal Responsibility: It’s All About 
Power, 41 STETSON L. REV. 97, 110 (2011). 
 45. See Goforth, supra note 14, at 634. 
 46. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 58 (2006). 
 47. See Peter Pringle, The Chronicles of Tobacco: An Account of the Forces That Brought 
the Tobacco Industry to the Negotiating Table, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 387, 387–88 (1999). 
 48. Goforth, supra note 14, at 648 (quoting James A. Waters, Catch 20.5: Corporate 
Morality as an Organizational Phenomenon, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, Spring 1978, at 5 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 49. Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1427 (2009). 
 50. Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 51. 
 51. Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
609, 618 n.42 (1998) (emphasis added); see Susanna M. Kim, Characteristics of Soulless Persons: 
The Applicability of the Character Evidence Rule to Corporations, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 763, 792 
(“People often search for group rather than individual-level causes for extremely negative 
events.”). 
 52. See Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 52.  
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seemingly counter-intuitively for the protection of corporations, or at 
least for the protection of law-abiding corporations. In many 
circumstances, corporations that disregard the law have a competitive 
advantage over corporations that follow the law.53 The criminal justice 
system would place these law-abiding corporations at an even greater 
disadvantage if criminal sanctions did not exist. 
The availability of civil corrective measures further complicates the 
appropriateness of criminal sanctions. It is possible that corporate 
misconduct could be controlled through civil enforcement, but it is also 
possible that this would be ineffective because civil fines cannot replicate 
the reputational harm of criminal sanctions.54 At the same time, this 
reputational damage stemming from criminal convictions is also 
problematic. The unpredictability associated with reputational damage 
may be advantageous,55 and yet, the general nature of reputational 
damage and the seeming inconsistency could lessen this advantage.56 
While there remain many objections and detractors, the supporters of 
corporate criminal sanctions currently outnumber their opponents.57 The 
jurists who favor corporate criminal liability do also argue, however, that 
the legal system should simplify the prosecution of corporations.58 To 
understand this part of the debate, it is helpful to examine the nature of 
the corporation in the eyes of the law.  
B.  Corporations and Personhood 
It is generally acknowledged that the corporate structure is needed in 
a modern business world, and the pooled resources at their command has 
been the source of most, if not all, great enterprises.59 Given this fact, it 
is important to understand how society generally views corporations. 
Scholars and commentators realized almost a hundred years ago that 
juries are more likely to find corporations guilty than they are to find 
individuals guilty.60 This willingness to attribute guilt to a corporation is 
unlikely to arise from corporations all being malevolent. As it happens, 
                                                                                                                     
 53. Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: 
Containing the Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 942 (2005). 
 54. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 
473, 512–16 (2006).  
 55. See id. at 514. 
 56. Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 38. 
 57. See Sean Bajkowski & Kimberly R. Thompson, Corporate Criminal Liability, 34 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 445, 445 (1997).  
 58. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 33, at 1481–82. 
 59. Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 
HASTINGS L.J. 577, 625 (1990) (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906)). 
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many early corporations were explicitly benevolent institutions, 
including several new church congregations.61 Indeed, many different 
types of organizations are formed as corporations, ranging from churches 
to the Guardian Angels (self-appointed public protectors) and even to the 
Ku Klux Klan.62 Furthermore, one must remember that most corporations 
are small: Of the three million businesses that belong to the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, more than ninety-five percent have fewer than 100 
employees, and of all federally taxed corporations, more than seventy-
five percent have less than one million dollars in receipts reported per 
year.63 Regardless of the variety of types of corporations, the fact remains 
that a lot of individuals view them with skepticism or downright hostility. 
Many people have concerned themselves with protecting democracy 
from the corruptive and often distorting effect of massive amounts of 
money collected through the corporate structure.64 This fear of 
corporations led to a number of people referring to them as “soulless,” 
and some—such as President Thomas Jefferson—fearing that they 
“would subvert the Republic.”65 This fear is based at least partly on the 
claim that if corporations have the same constitutional rights but 
increased power, the result is clearly the supremacy of the corporate form 
over the natural form of personhood.66 Nevertheless, this fear or dislike 
of corporations is far from universal, and many scholars maintain that 
while it may be true that corporations have been given too much power, 
that does not mean they are “bad.”67 
Whether corporations have been given too much power is easier to 
answer by looking at how society does and should think of corporations 
generally, from both theoretical and historical perspectives. Historically, 
at different points, America’s corporations and England’s have had 
limited constitutional protections when compared with individuals.68 In 
American history, corporations did not have a significant role in the 
Constitution. Justice John Paul Stevens pointed out that the Framers did 
not find it difficult to distinguish a corporation from a human.69 The 
Constitution does not name corporations.70 In fact, only four states 
(Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Vermont) mention 
                                                                                                                     
 61. See Goforth, supra note 14, at 625. 
 62. Miller, supra note 29, at 906. 
 63. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010). 
 64. Miller, supra note 29, at 896 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 240 U.S. 93, 205 (2003)). 
 65. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 66. Mayer, supra note 59, at 658. 
 67. See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, (Mis)conceptions of the Corporation, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 
734 (2013). 
 68. Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 204–05 (1946). 
 69. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 428. 
 70. Mayer, supra note 59, at 579. 
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corporations in their original constitutions,71 and in situations in which 
state constitutions did award specific rights to corporations, these were 
different than those given to individuals.72  
Jurists have disputed whether the corporation is an entity beyond the 
people involved and its legal status.73 Early on in this dispute, Chief 
Justice John Marshall described a corporation as “an artificial being, 
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the 
mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter 
of its creation confers upon it . . . .”74 For example, a corporation is not 
allowed to conduct business beyond the scope of its charter.75 In its most 
recent description of the corporate entity, the Court stated: 
A corporation is simply a form of organization used by 
human beings to achieve desired ends. An established body 
of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people 
(including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are 
associated with a corporation in one way or another. When 
rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to 
corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these 
people.76 
In line with this theory, while it is appropriate for courts to protect 
corporations from unlawful investigations, they are not equal with people 
in terms of a right to privacy.77 Justice Stevens pointed out that even 
though corporations have made many significant contributions to society, 
they are not members of society.78  
At various times, the Court has specifically expressed the belief that 
individuals and corporations have many important and apparent 
differences.79 In part because of the idea that corporations derive their 
existence and hence all privileges from the state, courts have limited their 
rights.80 For example, at one point, a Supreme Court Justice pointed out 
that if a law enforcement agency was simply “curious” about a 
                                                                                                                     
 71. Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a “Real” Constitutional Person, 11 U.C. 
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 221, 239–40 (2011). 
 72. Id. at 241.  
 73. Ripken, supra note 32, at 100. 
 74. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). 
 75. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–75 (1906), overruled in part by Murphy v. 
Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
 76. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). 
 77. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (citation omitted). 
 78. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 394 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 79. See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 105 (1988). 
 80. See id.  
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corporation, it would have the legitimate right to satisfy that curiosity by 
conducting investigations.81 The only significant limitations were that the 
curiosity had to deal with subject matter in the domain of particular 
agencies, the information requested was not too indefinite, and the 
information was reasonably relevant.82  
The decision in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad 
Co.83 showed another view, from an early Supreme Court, that a 
corporation has rights and duties conferred upon it stemming from the 
rights and duties of its human members.84 Today, it is established that 
courts treat corporations in many ways as though they are natural people. 
For example, not only can corporations be held responsible for criminal 
actions, they can also be parties to contracts, own property in their own 
name, sue others in court, and be sued by others in court.85 This does not 
mean, however, that the law should always treat them the same as natural 
persons. Furthermore, most would agree that a paramount goal in the law 
is that it should treat actors differently if they are in fact different but 
should treat them the same if they are significantly similar.86 From a 
constitutional perspective, treating entities that clearly differ the same as 
one another is just as large an error as treating those that are the same 
differently.87  
At their root, corporations exist because some endeavors require joint 
efforts and can only be achieved with many individuals participating.88 If 
the activities of large numbers of people are properly coordinated, the 
result can be far superior to the sum of what the individuals contributed.89 
One of the challenges that has arisen as a result, however, has been to 
define this new collective entity and answer whether it is a “person.” The 
Supreme Court declared in 1886 that a corporation is a person for at least 
some constitutional purposes.90 Yet, there are some basic differences 
between a “natural” person and a corporation. As Justice Stevens pointed 
out, corporations have several attributes that increase their ability to raise 
capital and use that capital in ways that maximize investors’ returns; these 
                                                                                                                     
 81. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 652. 
 82. Id. at 652–53. 
 83. 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
 84. Id. at 396.  
 85. Brickey, supra note 6, at 601. 
 86. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAWS 155 (1961). 
 87. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 35 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 88.  Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 264 (1999).  
 89. Id. 
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attributes include limited liability, the separation of control from 
ownership, possible unending life, and favorable legal treatment of both 
the accumulation of assets by the corporation and the eventual 
distribution of those assets.91 Recently, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
agreed with Justice Stevens that corporations do not have a conscience, 
belief, feelings, thoughts, or desires.92 There are at least three different 
ways that the law can view a corporation as a person: a moral person, a 
natural person, and a legal person.93 There is no doubt a corporation is 
not a natural person, nor is there any doubt that a corporation is a legal 
person; furthermore, one could argue that a corporation is also a moral 
person, and it is therefore appropriate to hold it morally accountable.94  
Scholars claim that because corporations are not humans or citizens, 
and in fact are just tools to human ends, society has no need to honor any 
claim of autonomy unless that autonomy is itself useful for humans.95 
Further evidence against a corporation’s personhood claim is that 
corporations can only decide, act, or intend anything through the human 
members of the corporation; without them, the corporation could not 
function or even have an identity.96 Nevertheless, this view of the 
corporation as an extension of the humans involved is belied by the fact 
that even if every human involved has died, the same corporation can live 
for several generations without changing.97 Another view of 
corporations, which contains a stronger link to personhood, is that each 
of them is unique and has its own personality, character, and mens rea 
that are social realities that the American people understand.98 When such 
corporations behave in a manner inconsistent with valuing human worth, 
they send a message that can only be corrected by the condemnation and 
power inherent in criminal prosecutions.99 After Citizens United v. 
FEC,100 some commentators have gone so far as to say that corporations 
                                                                                                                     
 91. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 465 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658–59 
(1990)). 
 92. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 466 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)). 
 93. See Kim, supra note 51, at 784. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Kent Greenfield et al., Should Corporations Have First Amendment Rights?, 30 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 875, 878 (2007). 
 96. Ripken, supra note 32, at 100–01. 
 97. PETER M. BLAU & W. RICHARD SCOTT, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE 
APPROACH 1 (1962). 
 98. Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith 
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76 MISS. L.J. 483, 486–87 (2006). 
 99. Id. at 487.  
 100. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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are people, at least for First Amendment purposes.101 An obvious 
question is: Once corporations are people for one right, why would they 
not be people in terms of other rights?102 Hence, some Supreme Court 
Justices have questioned whether there was a mistake when the Court 
gave human characteristics to an artificial creature created by state law.103 
Justice Stevens explained that people with differing understandings of the 
nature of corporations can all see that corporations are distinguishable 
from human beings and the government must therefore regulate them 
differently.104 It is possible that the United States may need a 
constitutional amendment to determine a corporation’s ultimate status.105 
For example, many scholars argue that the United States may need a 
constitutional amendment that states that corporations only have the 
rights specifically granted to them.106 
Until an amendment is forthcoming, this Article argues that the law 
should draw a crucial distinction between individuals and corporations, 
at least when it comes to how the law treats the application of the 
exclusionary rule. 
C.  The Purpose of Corporate Criminal Liability 
Beginning over one hundred years ago, prosecutions of very large 
companies started becoming more common; today, it is even possible for 
such a prosecution to result in the company’s death.107 Organizations are 
uniquely limited to fines and other non-incarcerating criminal 
penalties,108 but they are obviously still subject to significant 
repercussions.109 Some argue, however, that when a court punishes a 
corporation, what really happens is that the court punishes stockholders, 
most of whom were perfectly innocent, and the court essentially deprives 
                                                                                                                     
 101. Christopher Slobogin, Citizens United and Corporate and Human Crime, 41 STETSON 
L. REV. 127, 127 (2011) (quoting Jim Hightower, Fighting the Subversion of Our People’s 
Sovereignty, TRUTHOUT (Feb. 26, 2010, 12:30 PM), http://archive.truthout.org/jim-hightower-
fighting-subversion-our-peoples-sovereignty57194). 
 102. Miller, supra note 29, at 915.  
 103. See, e.g., id. at 897 (discussing Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s reflections on whether the 
Court erred in giving a corporation human characteristics). 
 104. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 466 n.72 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 105. Mayer, supra note 59, at 651. 
 106. Dibadj, supra note 67, at 782. 
 107. Lance Cole, Reexamining the Collective Entity Doctrine in the New Era of Limited 
Liabilty Entities—Should Business Entities Have a Fifth Amendment Privilege?, 2005 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 72. 
 108. Alan L. Adlestein, A Corporation’s Right to a Jury Trial Under the Sixth Amendment, 
27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 375, 387 (1994).   
 109. See id. at 386–87.  
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them of their property with no ability to object or even be heard on the 
issue.110 Other scholars argue that because of the difficulty involved in 
identifying and prosecuting an individual participating in corporate 
activities, the legal system needs to be able to use vicarious attribution 
for corporations.111 However, still other scholars point out that this has 
led to criminal prosecutions even when corporate management 
apparently took significant steps to avoid the commission of criminal 
activities.112 Prosecutors reportedly “want businesses to cooperate with 
them and aid them in their efforts to prosecute corporate employees who 
violate federal law. Prosecutors themselves will frankly admit that the 
purpose of corporate criminal liability is not to punish corporations, but 
to force them to help in the prosecution of their employees.”113 After the 
scandals surrounding companies such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco, 
Congress passed legislation (primarily the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002) 
that not only increased penalties for preexisting crimes, but also created 
new criminal sanctions for behaviors that had not previously been 
deemed criminal.114  
Deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and incapacitation are 
generally the quintessential purposes of criminal prosecutions.115 The 
U.S. Supreme Court has held that deterrence is an appropriate purpose of 
criminal liability and that retribution is another legitimate basis for 
criminal corporate prosecutions because corporations can appropriately 
be considered blameworthy.116 Another legitimate purpose of the 
criminal law is the expression of condemnation. There are a wide variety 
of types and degrees of condemnation for the different kinds of criminal 
acts. That being said, there is almost always some level of condemnation 
present, and some argue that this expression serves purposes beyond 
deterrence.117 Helping to shape and convey society’s feelings of 
                                                                                                                     
 110. See, e.g., V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of 
Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355, 363 (1999) (citing N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. 
v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492 (1909)). 
 111. Adlestein, supra note 108, at 385.  
 112. Id. at 386.   
 113. Hasnas, supra note 38, at 512. 
 114. See Nancy R. Mansfield et al., The Shocking Impact of Corporate Scandal on Directors’ 
and Officers’ Liability, 20 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 211, 231 (2012) (emphasizing the number of 
unprecedented corporate scandals in the early twenty-first century and the Bush Administration’s 
subsequent passage in 2002 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, which included provisions directly 
responding to these companies’ past criminal acts). 
 115. See Brickey, supra note 6, at 605–06; Sheley, supra note 7, at 230. 
 116. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492–93 (1909).  
 117. See Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 6; see also Kahan, supra note 51, at 618–19 (arguing 
that corporate crimes “denigrate social values” and that corporate criminal punishment helps 
reaffirm those values). For a discussion of the expressive function of criminal liability in the 
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condemnation is one of the possible goals of criminal law.118 On the other 
hand, some might argue that neither expression nor retribution are proper 
goals. Many commentators believe that deterrence is the main object of 
corporate criminal liability,119 and many scholars and judges treat it as 
the primary, if not sole, goal for such liability.120  
Deterrence can be both general and specific in this context. General 
deterrence refers to the idea that even those who are not themselves 
punished can be deterred from committing a crime by observing or at 
least being aware of the punishment that others received for the same 
crime.121 Specific deterrence, on the other hand, is directed at the actual 
(or specific) person or institution that committed the offense and tries to 
prevent that entity from committing the same or similar acts in the 
future.122 To successfully use the deterrence rationale, and hence to 
justify corporate criminal liability as opposed to just individual liability, 
one must show that corporate criminal liability provides a marginal 
increase in deterrence in addition to the level that individual liability 
alone accomplishes.123 To demonstrate this more effectively, it is useful 
to understand some of the specific factors that affect decision-making 
behavior. In at least one survey of corporate ethics, the survey classified 
“superiors” as the most important contributing factor to criminal or 
unethical decision-making.124 In view of this, criminal liability should 
encourage the optimal level of effort on the parts of owners and managers 
when they guide their various agents to comply with the law.125 As this 
Article discusses later, it is entirely possible that removing the 
reassurance of the exclusionary rule and therefore making prosecution 
and conviction more likely will increase the amount of deterrence that 
corporations experience.  
In line with maximizing utility, what a judge should do when 
punishing a corporation is encourage the corporation to engage in an 
amount of monitoring that will avoid criminal conduct that would harm 
society more than the cost of the monitoring.126 Corporate liability may 
not only serve as an external constraint, but should also be considered a 
                                                                                                                     
intellectual property context, see Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual 
Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 494 (2011). 
 118. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a 
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 37. 
 119. See, e.g., Khanna, supra note 110, at 363.  
 120. See, e.g., Khanna, supra note 3, at 1494 nn.91–93. 
 121. Brickey, supra note 6, at 606. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Khanna, supra note 3, at 1494–95. 
 124. CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 46, at 59. 
 125. See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1972).  
 126. Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1360. 
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way to induce internal monitoring.127 In addition, corporate crime seems 
to be a contagious problem. For instance, over the course of the last 
decade, almost all top tier pharmaceutical companies either agreed to a 
settlement involving significant misconduct or simply pled guilty.128 In 
acknowledging the problem and referring to possible solutions, the U.S. 
Supreme Court made a significant point when it said that “to give 
[corporations] immunity from all punishment because of the old and 
exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime would 
virtually take away the only means of effectually controlling the subject-
matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.”129 Today, this statement is 
almost certainly overstated due to the many administrative agencies and 
extended civil liability that could work to curtail corporate misconduct.130 
Notwithstanding this fact, laws dealing with corporate criminal liability 
not only survived, but also their number actually increased 
dramatically.131 The survival and proliferation of these laws is caused in 
part by the law’s capability to simultaneously achieve expressive 
benefits, positive consequential benefits, and retributive and just goals.132 
Whichever goals society chooses to pursue, the legal system still needs 
to address how to successfully accomplish them within the framework of 
corporate criminal liability.  
D.  Achieving the Goals of Corporate Criminal Liability 
After the decision in New York Central,133 courts used the principle of 
respondeat superior to establish liability without any significant 
additional analysis.134 The statute under review in that case explicitly 
stated that the Court could hold a corporation liable.135 Shortly after the 
Court resolved that case, many courts started reading other criminal 
statutes as though the legislature meant the statute to apply to 
corporations, even when there was little to no indication that the 
legislature intended to have that happen.136 Under the newly established 
(at least in the criminal context) respondeat superior standard, there are 
three necessary conditions for a court to hold a corporation criminally 
                                                                                                                     
 127. Id. 
 128. Beale, supra note 33, at 1484.  
 129. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495–96 (1909). 
 130.  Baer, supra note 15, at 4.  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 2. 
 133. 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
 134. Alschuler, supra note 5, at 1364. 
 135. N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 491. 
 136. See, e.g., United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 54–55 (1909); London v. 
Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 F. 506, 507, 510 (1st Cir. 1910); People v. Star Co., 120 N.Y.S. 
498, 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909); State v. Ice & Fuel Co., 81 S.E. 737, 738 (N.C. 1914). 
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liable: (1) an agent of the corporation acted with the requisite mental 
state, (2) the agent acted within the scope of his employment, and (3) the 
agent intended to benefit the corporation.137 
In addition to courts’ arguably unintended application of respondeat 
superior, some federal courts also imposed liability upon corporations 
based on a theory of collective mens rea.138 Under this theory, no specific 
individual ever had the required mens rea, but the court could deem the 
corporation to have had it, which results in company liability even though 
the court could not identify a culpable individual.139 An example of 
collective mens rea is if one agent of a corporation puts hazardous waste 
in a river without knowing that it is hazardous waste, and at the same 
time, another agent of the corporation does not put anything in the river 
but does know about the hazardousness of the material, then the 
corporation knowingly dumped the hazardous material in the river and is 
liable via the collective mens rea.140  
In fact, not only is mens rea arguably simpler to prove in a corporate 
setting, but all of the elements of criminal corporate liability are fairly 
easily met for a number of reasons. For example, the requirement that an 
agent act within the scope of his employment can be satisfied even though 
the corporation explicitly forbade the wrongful conduct.141 Another 
example of the ease of fulfilling the requirements is the requirement that 
the agent “benefit the corporation.”142 This element can be satisfied even 
if that was not his only motivation or if he had ultimately not benefitted 
the corporation at all.143 Some argue that even potentially excessive 
prosecutions of corporations—which result in punishment for 
employees’ actions that are clearly against publicized corporate 
policies—can help to deter wrongdoing and serve to encourage 
corporations to implement effective measures as opposed to empty policy 
declarations.144 The idea is that it is less likely that a corporation could 
impose a facially solid compliance program and never actually affect the 
culture or desire to comply with the law.145 Due to this possibility, courts 
                                                                                                                     
 137. Khanna, supra note 3, at 1489–90. 
 138. Michael B. Metzger & Dan R. Dalton, Seeing the Elephant: An Organizational 
Perspective on Corporate Moral Agency, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 489, 501 (1996).  
 139. Id. 
 140. Khanna, supra note 110, at 408. 
 141.  Khanna, supra note 3, at 1489.  
 142.  Id. at 1490.  
 143. Id. Practically speaking, whether the culture of the corporation partially caused the 
criminal activity or it was simply a “rogue” employee is something prosecutors consider.  Baer, 
supra note 15, at 7. 
 144. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement 
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 55–56 n.6 (1986). 
 145. Ramirez, supra note 53, at 965–66. 
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usually do not acknowledge even extensive compliance programs as a 
defense to the illegal conduct, even if only one employee committed the 
crime.146 Avoiding criminal behavior is obviously very desirable, but 
extreme penalties can cause overdeterrence and lead to an inappropriate 
increase in corporate resources devoted to enforcement.147 
 One of the most important questions that the courts must answer to 
achieve an optimal criminal law system in both the individual and 
corporate contexts is what evidence will be permissible in prosecutions. 
The next Part analyzes this issue and explores the arguments for and 
against the use of the exclusionary rule as a tool to protect defendants’ 
Fourth Amendment rights. 
II.  THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
Admitting relevant evidence—unless there is a good reason to exclude 
it—and excluding irrelevant evidence are two fundamental tenets of 
evidence law.148 Arguably, the exclusionary rule violates this tenet. The 
rule prevents courts from admitting evidence obtained in violation of the 
Constitution.149 Specifically, and most relevant for this Article, the 
prosecution cannot introduce evidence, obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, at trial to prove the defendant’s guilt.150 It is worth 
examining why the rule exists, where it originated, and what role it should 
play for corporate criminal prosecutions. 
A.  The History of the Exclusionary Rule 
While the exclusionary rule applies almost exclusively to criminal 
law, the Fourth Amendment deals with all searches and seizures and does 
not distinguish between criminal and civil matters.151 The Amendment 
also does not discuss suppression of evidence gathered in violation of its 
commands.152 The exclusionary rule first appeared in a fairly cryptic form 
in the 1886 case of Boyd v. United States153 and made its first significant 
                                                                                                                     
 146. Brickey, supra note 6, at 604. 
 147. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 27, at 325–26. 
 148. See Michael S. Pardo, The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory, 66 VAND. L. REV. 
547, 562–63 (2013). 
 149.   Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (applying the exclusionary rule in 
federal court), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying 
the exclusionary rule in state court). 
 150. Id.  
 151. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 758 
(1994). 
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appearance in the 1914 case of Weeks v. United States.154 In fact, until 
well into the nineteenth century, courts did not consider the source of the 
evidence but rather only its probative value.155 If evidence was probative, 
the court admitted it.156 Courts have acknowledged that the suppressed 
evidence can at times be the best evidence possible about a defendant’s 
guilt or innocence.157 In England, if physical evidence is obtained by a 
coerced confession, the physical evidence is admitted and only the 
confession itself is suppressed.158 Scholars characterize all evidentiary 
practices that prevent information from being viewed by the judge or jury 
as “truth-suppressing devices.”159 The courts held early violators of 
search and seizure law civilly liable for offenses including trespass, 
assault and battery, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution.160 As 
the Supreme Court said, excluding evidence is not considered vitally 
necessary to protect constitutional rights in most of the English-speaking 
world.161 
There is in fact nothing in the Fourth Amendment that expressly 
precludes the use of evidence obtained in violation of that Amendment.162 
Some commentators claim that the Framers deemed remedies such as 
civil lawsuits for damages to adequately protect the rights that they had 
established.163 The birth of the modern police force and diminution of tort 
remedies for trespass and false arrest at least partly necessitated the birth 
of the exclusionary rule.164  
Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he 
maxim that ‘every man’s house is his castle,’ is made a part of our 
constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and has always been looked upon as of high value to the 
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citizen.”165 The Supreme Court at one point went so far as to say that if 
the government can confiscate letters and other private documents to use 
against a defendant, the government would render meaningless the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment against searches and seizures.166 
Fourth Amendment breaches reflect “a failure to foster a constitutional 
culture in which rights are fully respected, and the denial of a remedy for 
breach by society’s representatives is a de facto endorsement of the 
wrong.”167 At the same time, nothing is said in the Fourth Amendment 
about how the government should enforce the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.168 The only constitutional 
requirement that ensures the protections of the Fourth Amendment is that 
there be “some effective remedy.”169 On the other hand, the Court 
described the exclusionary doctrine as an essential component of the right 
to privacy.170 Even before the Supreme Court applied the exclusionary 
rule to the states, some states independently decided that exclusion was 
an appropriate remedy; for example, California believed that other 
remedies were not sufficient, and therefore it had to impose the 
exclusionary rule upon itself.171 Eventually, the Supreme Court agreed 
and stated that other remedies had failed to uphold the guarantees of the 
Fourth Amendment, and therefore the Court had to apply the 
exclusionary rule to the states.172  
Initially, the Court examined multiple rationales for doing so. The 
Court examined protecting judicial integrity along with protecting the 
personal constitutional rights of defendants; however, the Court 
ultimately saw deterring law enforcement misbehavior as the dominant 
rationale.173 The Court held in 1960 that the “purpose [of the exclusionary 
rule] is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the 
only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard 
it.”174 As early as the mid-1970s, courts discussed deterrence as the 
                                                                                                                     
 165. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A 
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primary, if not the only, relevant purpose.175 In one of the earliest 
modern-day exclusion cases, the Court pointed out that the rule was not 
a “command” of the Fourth Amendment but rather a judicially fashioned 
rule of evidence.176 Further, because the purpose of most rules of 
evidence is to enable the discovery of the truth by preventing the 
introduction of unreliable evidence and evidence intended to mislead,177 
and the exclusionary rule blatantly contradicts that principle,178 the Court 
was very conscious of the costs it was imposing by mandating its use. 
Indeed, parties file suppression motions in approximately seven percent 
of criminal cases and are successful approximately twelve percent of the 
time.179 While these figures may not sound high at first blush, some 
scholars claim that the criminal justice system may release as many as 
55,000 or more accused criminals per year through the use of the 
exclusionary rule.180 The Court acknowledged that even illegally seized 
evidence can be very probative and reliable.181 Before a court excludes 
illegally obtained evidence, it has to balance the value of making 
judgments using all of the facts against the intended deterrent impact of 
excluding such evidence.182  
In the past, courts applied the exclusionary rule much more liberally 
and in fact almost automatically once courts found a Fourth Amendment 
violation.183 Today, courts refuse to apply the exclusionary rule in many 
situations.184 Some scholars discuss the seeming arbitrariness of the 
exceptions that courts currently apply to the exclusionary rule.185 
Whether arbitrary or not, there are certainly a significant number of them. 
Courts ruled evidence admissible for particular purposes such as 
                                                                                                                     
 175. Levine, supra note 156, at 601–02. 
 176. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 661 (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39–40 (1949)). 
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 185. E.g., Dripps, supra note 164, at 1608–09. 
 
22
Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss4/4
2016] CORPORATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 1141 
 
impeachment,186 civil tax cases,187 and grand jury proceedings.188 In 
many settings, the question as to whether the court should use the 
exclusionary rule has resulted in conflicting decisions by many lower 
courts.189 In other situations, courts established that exclusion is 
inappropriate.190 Courts may exclude evidence from the case in chief that 
is later used to impeach a defendant.191 When police officers make a 
“good-faith” error, the evidence recovered is not excluded, pursuant to 
the so-called Leon exception.192 The Court in Arizona v. Evans extended 
the Leon exception to clerical errors193 and under some circumstances to 
legislative mistakes in Illinois v. Krull.194 The Court also held that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of the “knock and announce 
rule”195 or to civil deportation proceedings.196  
Today’s courts apply a balancing test to the exclusionary rule and only 
use it when the advantages of deterring police misconduct outweigh the 
societal costs of excluding valuable information.197 Multiple scholars 
claim that it is a totally different situation when police procedures 
intentionally and blatantly violate the Constitution rather than when one 
police officer, perhaps even accidentally, acts inappropriately.198 As the 
Supreme Court pointed out, to answer the question of whether to exclude 
evidence, one must mediate “between the sometimes competing goals of, 
on the one hand, deterring official misconduct and removing inducements 
to unreasonable invasions of privacy and, on the other, establishing 
procedures under which criminal defendants are ‘acquitted or convicted 
on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.’”199 Police 
conduct leads to exclusion only when it is deliberate enough to produce 
                                                                                                                     
 186. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980). 
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meaningful deterrence and culpable enough to merit the loss to the justice 
system.200 Since Leon, courts have focused on the seriousness and 
obvious nature of police actions when making the cost–benefit 
analysis.201 “In order to exclude unlawfully-obtained evidence, the 
benefit of ‘some incremental deterrent’ to police misconduct must 
outweigh the ‘substantial social cost’ of setting a criminal free.”202 In 
Leon, the Court explicitly stated that “the scope of the exclusionary rule 
is subject to change in light of changing judicial understanding about the 
effects of the rule outside the confines of the courtroom.”203 Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court explained that in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment, there are ways to modify the exclusionary rule without 
inhibiting it from exercising its original function.204 The Court has stated 
that society must take the “bitter pill” of exclusion only as a last resort.205 
B.  Arguments Supporting the Exclusion of Evidence 
Over the decades since the exclusionary rule has been in effect, there 
have been many arguments both defending it and attacking it. This 
Section addresses in more detail some of the primary arguments 
supporting the proposition that courts should exclude evidence that is 
illegally obtained. As discussed in the previous Section, by far the 
primary justification for the exclusionary rule is that it is the only 
effective way to deter police misconduct. The Supreme Court has also, 
however, offered judicial integrity as another ground for the exclusionary 
rule.206 By doing so, it was following Justice Louis Brandeis’s earlier 
dissent in which he wrote: “Our government is the potent, the 
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by 
its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a law-
breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law 
unto himself; it invites anarchy.”207 The rationale of judicial integrity 
contains two ideas: (1) stopping the wrongdoer from getting the 
advantage of his wrong by not allowing the use of illegally seized 
evidence and (2) protecting the trust in governmental institutions is 
                                                                                                                     
 200. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011). 
 201. Id. at 2427. 
 202. Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, “A More Majestic Conception”: The Importance 
of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 48 (2010) 
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paramount.208 This argument boils down to the idea that it is necessary to 
uphold the stature of the courts and that this would become difficult if 
they allowed lawless behavior.209 
Another argument in favor of exclusion is actually a response to the 
claim that alternative responses could achieve the deterrent effect society 
desires. One often suggested alternative is the possibility of damages, 
meaning that the victims could sue and recover from the police officer 
who violated their rights.210 Some are concerned, however, that 
restitution to victims will not appropriately deter police officers from 
violating the law.211 There is somewhat conflicting evidence on the 
successfulness or realism of suing police departments.212 Most winning 
damages cases involve some type of police brutality or illegal 
detention.213 
Obtaining reparations in this form is difficult for multiple reasons. For 
one, it is hard to get damages in civil cases even if a violation is shown 
because the specific harm caused by the violation is difficult to prove.214 
Attorneys’ fees may only be available in some cases.215 Additionally, 
jurors are reluctant to find in favor of plaintiffs who have been convicted 
of a related offense.216 It is well known that jurors do not like to award 
damages to convicted felons.217 Another difficulty with the damages 
remedy is that the largest harm is possibly the jail time associated with 
conviction, and it is unlikely that anybody would agree to pay a guilty 
defendant based upon the length of her sentence.218 Another hurdle for a 
plaintiff—who is a civil plaintiff and is most likely also a criminal 
defendant—to overcome is that for him to prevail, he would need to show 
not only that there has been a constitutional violation, but also that 
qualified immunity does not bar recovery.219 Under “qualified 
immunity,” in many situations a government official cannot be sued if the 
conduct did not violate clear rights that a reasonable person would have 
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known about.220 However, under some circumstances, officials can lose 
that immunity.221 Qualified immunity may not apply if the violation is 
egregious, such as if the search warrant did not describe any of the items 
to be seized,222 but this is not an easy hurdle to overcome. Another 
potential problem for alternative remedies is the fact that the courts have 
upheld agreements in which search victims waive civil remedies in 
exchange for a favorable plea bargain.223 So, if a police officer violates 
someone’s rights, the government could persuade the defendant away 
from enforcing his rights as part of a plea negotiation.  
On the other hand, the legal system may not reach the desired goal 
even if there are successful lawsuits against the police. A possible 
problem with direct remedies against police officers may be 
overdeterrence.224 The concern is basically that society does not want 
police officers to avoid searches of criminal suspects all the time out of 
fear for the officers’ own homes or personal property if they are mistaken 
about the constitutionality of a search.225 If damages are too high, they 
will result in overdeterrence, but if they are too low, they will not deter 
enough.226 The courts can potentially avoid this problem if they impose 
liability on the state rather than the officer and have the state encourage 
individuals to act lawfully.227 Other possible approaches could include 
the use of police department administrative procedures or even possibly 
criminal prosecutions for violating a suspect’s constitutional rights,228 
although these measures all contain their own difficulties.  
One issue with any of these alternative forms of enforcing the 
constitutional protections occurs if the agents of the state are unknown, 
as in Weeks v. United States.229 If the individuals’ identities are unknown, 
they cannot be personally sued and departments cannot take 
administrative action against them. Additionally, the Supreme Court 
pointed out the past ineffectiveness of prosecutions against police 
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officers, administrative disciplinary actions, and trespass tort suits.230 
Various scholars claim all the remedies other than exclusion are 
useless.231 In fact, some Justices have gone so far as to say that without 
the use of exclusion, the result is effectively no sanction at all.232 The 
modern courts’ approach to Fourth Amendment violations reflects the 
idea that once someone suffers a harm stemming from the violation, it 
cannot be repaired, and that privacy harms are irreversible.233 Therefore, 
damages would not suffice to correct the problem. 
C.  Arguments Against the Exclusion of Evidence 
One of the most famous quotations dealing with the exclusionary rule 
comes from Justice (then-Judge) Benjamin Cardozo, who said, “The 
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.”234 While this 
quotation encompasses much of what many people find objectionable 
about the exclusionary rule—that a criminal goes free due to a mistake—
it is far from the sole objection to the rule. This Section examines several 
of the criticisms to the rule in preparation for applying its rationales to 
corporations, which is explained in Part III.  
As Justice Potter Stewart pointed out, there are at least four legitimate 
objections to the exclusionary rule: (1) it works only by imposing a very 
high cost on society, depriving courts of reliable evidence and freeing the 
guilty; (2) it may not in fact deter unconstitutional police conduct; (3) it 
may benefit a defendant in a way that is not proportional to the Fourth 
Amendment rights that were violated; and (4) it “compensates” only 
those accused of a crime.235 In the case of People v. Defore, Justice (then-
Judge) Cardozo gave a further oft-repeated argument against the 
exclusionary rule that this Article mentioned previously: there are other 
ways to enforce the Fourth Amendment. Cardozo argues in Defore that 
the remedies available were a lawsuit by the victim, prosecution of the 
officer for oppression, removal of the officer from his position, or other 
various types of work-related sanctions imposed by the officer’s 
superiors.236 In addition to Justice Cardozo’s ways of enforcing the 
Fourth Amendment, Professor Akhil Amar points out multiple options 
available to prevent constitutional violations, including injunctions, 
respondeat superior or vicarious liability, administrative regulations and 
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remedies, Bivens actions, and class actions.237 Also, police departments 
have various other responses to officer violations of search and seizure 
policies, ranging from time off with or without pay to expulsion from the 
police force.238 Different possible responses to violations of the Fourth 
Amendment could include criminal penalty options that already exist, 
such as criminal sanctions for unlawful detention, criminal trespass, or 
deliberate official misconduct.239 Justice Antonin Scalia pointed out that 
there are also an increasing number of alternative remedies, including the 
recognition of entity liability, attorneys’ fees paid to § 1983 plaintiffs, 
and increased police professionalism.240  
There are additional criticisms of the deterrence rationale outside the 
claim that other means may be more effective or have lower costs. Some 
scholars suggest that under particular circumstances, the rule may not deter 
police officers because the exclusion of the evidence does not concern 
them given that they are pursuing goals other than prosecution.241 For 
example, a police officer may knowingly violate the Constitution if she 
thinks that catching a juvenile in the act of committing a crime may enable 
him to get counseling or even possibly just “scare him straight.”242 In these 
types of situations, exclusion will likely have little to no effect.243 The 
power of the incentive that motivates the illegal act dictates whether 
deterrence works.244 Another circumstance under which deterrence is 
ineffective is if the evidence is perishable and the officer knows it is going 
to be destroyed.245 Unless the evidence is obtainable by constitutional 
means, exclusion of the evidence will have absolutely no deterrent effect 
whatsoever because the police are better off gathering it either way.246 For 
example, if an officer knows or suspects that if she does not go into a house 
immediately, the perpetrator will destroy the illegal drugs (but she does not 
have enough information to satisfy an exigent circumstance requirement 
which would allow the search), she is unlikely to refrain from entering the 
house simply because the court could exclude the drugs she finds. This is 
especially true if she knows that it is possible that the government may use 
the evidence in some other way, such as for impeachment purposes.  
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In addition to the questionable effectiveness of the rule and the 
existence of alternative means of deterrence, commentators point out 
other objections to the exclusionary rule. Some jurists note its high costs, 
“including the suppression of reliable evidence, deflection of the fact-
finding process that often frees the guilty, diversion of attention from the 
central question of guilt or innocence, and the resulting disrespect for the 
law when evidence is excluded for minor and inadvertent Fourth 
Amendment violations.”247 This disrespect for the law is often referred to 
or characterized as the judicial integrity argument that this Article 
mentioned previously.248 While courts must guard the integrity of the 
judicial process, this concern is not very effective as a justification for the 
exclusion of extremely probative evidence.249 The integrity argument 
relies on the idea that in some ways admitting the evidence makes the 
court a party to the constitutional violation. That being said, this begs the 
question of what part of the Constitution mandates that courts not use 
illegally obtained evidence in a criminal prosecution.250 Furthermore, the 
integrity argument can at least in part be rebutted if one recognizes the 
three purposes that a judge has: (1) to do justice; (2) to protect the public 
from dangerous individuals; and (3) to protect everyone’s constitutional 
rights, although these purposes are potentially in tension with one another 
if a judge believes that the police violated a dangerous individual’s 
rights.251 This tension can lead to a seeming loss of integrity on the part 
of the courts, regardless of the way in which they rule on the tainted 
evidence.252 Resolving the issue optimally is key because overuse of the 
exclusionary rule may result in ridicule and disrespect for the law and 
judicial system.253 In fact, observers note that it is even possible for the 
Fourth Amendment itself to become contemptible or disfavored by both 
judges and citizens due to the exclusionary rule.254 Critics point out that 
when the public’s perception is that the outcome offends justice, that in 
turn can also damage judicial integrity.255 Arguably, the court could 
maintain its integrity if the judge could award sanctions against the police 
while still using the evidence against the defendant.256 
This argument about maintaining judicial integrity by awarding 
sanctions raises the question of how the law could best structure damages. 
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Shortly before the Mapp case, the Court construed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 
permit damages suits for Fourth Amendment violations.257 Damages may 
be more appropriate for at least three reasons; namely, they compensate 
innocent and guilty individuals, they can be proportionate as they vary 
depending upon the conduct, and they could represent a more effective 
form of “specific deterrence” against the officer involved.258 The use of 
restitution also allows both the guilty and the innocent to benefit because 
parties who suffered unconstitutional searches but never became criminal 
defendants could also sue.259 Damages are more precise and can better 
protect against the risks of overdeterrence or underdeterrence because the 
legal system can calibrate them to each case.260 Furthermore, you can 
hold a government body liable if a governmental policy enabled or 
contributed to the unconstitutional act.261 A possible civil action against 
the state may be effective because it would give the victim a deep pocket 
to pursue and would incentivize the state to properly train and motivate 
its police officers.262 Historically speaking, civil trespass actions, for 
example, have flourished against many different kinds of government 
agents.263 
Another argument against the exclusionary rule is basically that it is 
both disproportionate and rewards the wrong party. Jurists argue that the 
exclusionary rule is irrational in that it overly rewards criminals by 
commuting all penalties from crimes they in fact did commit while 
simultaneously never compensating the innocent for any of their real 
injuries.264 The bottom line effect of the exclusionary rule is often to 
prevent the truth from being exposed and allow a guilty individual to 
continue walking among other members of the community with no 
punishment or consequences.265 In fact, even the Supreme Court seems 
to acknowledge that suppressing probative evidence is a windfall for 
criminals.266 In Linkletter v. Walker,267 the Court has stated and repeated 
that ‘“[r]ejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing 
official, while it may, and likely will, release the wrong-doing 
defendant. . . . [It] does nothing to protect innocent persons who are the 
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victims of illegal but fruitless searches.”’268 It gives the innocent nothing 
while it frees the guilty.269 In addition to rewarding the guilty, it is also 
potentially ill-timed and grossly disproportionate.270 The wrongs 
condemned by the Fourth Amendment’s violations are complete with the 
unlawful search or seizure, and the exclusionary rule cannot remove or 
even repair the already suffered breach of the defendant’s rights.271 On 
the other hand, some commentators suggest that while the breach of the 
defendant’s rights may complete the irreversible harm, it may not be a 
significant enough harm to justify the rule in the first place. These 
commentators explain that the typical harms resulting from a standard 
wrongful house search are dignitary (but not usually massive) and may 
also include some mild property damage.272 Thus, there is a potential 
disparity between the “offense,” which may be a relatively small 
constitutional violation, and a remedy in the form of the release of a 
criminal. Chief Justice Warren Burger gave the classic statement of this 
critique when he wrote that “[f]reeing either a tiger or a mouse in a 
schoolroom is an illegal act, but no rational person would suggest that 
these two acts should be punished in the same way.”273 
The final objection to the exclusionary rule discussed in this Section 
is the more general idea that it violates some of the basic purposes of the 
court and judiciary system. The Supreme Court directs that the aims of 
the law are that no innocent suffer and no guilty escape.274 In the 
application of the exclusionary rule, the exact opposite occurs; the guilty 
do escape while the innocent suffer. The most basic role of the judiciary 
is that the court should try those properly brought before it, convict and 
pronounce a just punishment for those who are guilty, and acquit those 
who are innocent.275 A significant cost of applying the exclusionary rule 
is the impairment of this truth-finding function of the judge and jury.276 
Other costs, in addition to this impairment, are those associated with 
charges that had to be dropped and significantly less leverage for 
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prosecutors during plea bargaining sessions and at trial.277 Some jurists 
have criticized the costs of the exclusionary rule to the point where they 
question its continued need.278 At least to some observers, two wrongs do 
not make a right, and similarly, one evil (police misconduct) is not 
corrected by another evil (letting a guilty man go free).279 
Now that this Article has analyzed both the arguments in favor of the 
exclusionary rule and those opposed to it, it analyzes how these 
arguments relate to corporations. It is useful to begin, however, with a 
look at the applicability of the Fourth Amendment itself to corporations. 
III.  THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND CORPORATIONS 
This Part examines the applicability of the exclusionary rule in the 
corporate setting. It then examines both the goal of deterrence and other 
historical rationales for the rule to show that all of them support only a 
narrow application of the rule in the corporate setting. Finally, this Part 
presents a proposal to have a default prohibition against use of the 
exclusionary rule in the corporate setting. 
A.  The Fourth Amendment and Corporations 
As this Article previously indicated, the Constitution is silent about 
corporations, which is particularly understandable given that there were 
fewer than 400 corporations in existence during the Eighteenth 
Century.280 It is likely that the Framers were not particularly concerned 
with the rights of these fairly rare entities. According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau, there were approximately six million corporations as of a few 
years ago.281 Hence, the issue of corporations’ constitutional status, 
which may not have weighed heavily on the Framers’ minds, is much 
more significant today. Conflicts involving an increasing number of 
constitutional rights being applied to corporations are likely given the fact 
that courts are already struggling with an expansion of corporate First 
Amendment rights.282 As many scholars and authors point out, the 
number of prosecutions of corporate defendants by the federal 
government has generally increased over time;283 thus, parties litigate 
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constitutional issues surrounding the status of corporations more 
frequently.284 
The focus of this Article is whether and how the Fourth Amendment 
should apply to corporate entities. The full text of the Fourth Amendment 
states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.285 
The Supreme Court has explicitly noted that the state cannot use the 
provision of special advantages given to corporations, such as perpetual 
life or limited liability, as a price for the forfeiture of constitutional 
rights.286 On the other hand, there are several examples of individuals or 
groups who receive different constitutional protections depending upon 
their status, including students in public schools,287 prison inmates,288 
members of the military,289 and federal employees.290 As undeniable as it 
is that the law often considers corporations as “persons” under a familiar 
legal fiction, it is also true that this fiction exists to protect human 
beings.291 To determine if a corporation gets any particular constitutional 
protection, look at the nature, history, and purpose of the part of the 
Constitution in question.292 The goals of the Fourth Amendment—
privacy; dignity; and the ability to secure one’s person, home, and 
papers—point toward a personal right, and if analyzed by this standard, 
a corporation may not be able to receive Fourth Amendment 
protection.293 The Supreme Court has in fact repeatedly held that 
                                                                                                                     
 284. Id. at 376–77. 
 285. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 286. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350–51 (2010).  
 287. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (The rights of 
a public school student are not “automatically coextensive” with those of an average adult.). 
 288. See, e.g., Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (A 
prison inmate does not keep his First Amendment rights when they are “inconsistent with his 
status as a prisoner.” (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974))). 
 289. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (Based on the military mission of 
discipline and obedience, courts apply First Amendment protection differently to an individual in 
the military.). 
 290. See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL–CIO, 413 
U.S. 548, 593 (1973) (Congress has the power to limit First Amendment rights to federal 
employees by forbidding acts such as those linked to political campaigning.). 
 291. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). 
 292. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778–79 n.14 (1978). 
 293. Miller, supra note 29, at 912. 
 
33
Wagner: Corporate Criminal Prosecutions and the Exclusionary Rule
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1152 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
protecting an individuals’ security and privacy from government 
officials’ arbitrary invasion is the primary purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment.294 The Supreme Court clarified over a hundred years ago 
that it is the invasion of a person’s right of personal security, liberty, and 
private property that is the essence of the offense, not the mere breaking 
of doors or rifling of papers.295 Further, many would argue that a 
significant difference between privacy and property wrongs is that 
privacy wrongs are irreversible, and property wrongs are not.296 In the 
corporate setting, however, this becomes highly confusing. How can a 
violation of a corporation’s privacy rights compare to a violation of the 
privacy rights of an individual? It appears more likely that corporations 
would only suffer property right violations whose harms a court can 
reverse through monetary compensation.  
Despite the differences between individuals and corporations, the 
latter have at times successfully availed themselves of a variety of 
provisions in the Bill of Rights since the 1970s.297 Courts granted 
corporations a significant number of rights, including free speech 
(political, commercial, and negative free speech), trial by a jury, and 
freedom from unreasonable regulatory searches and double jeopardy.298 
The Constitution confers some rights to corporations but does not confer 
others.299 Even though in recent years corporations have received more 
and more constitutional protections,300 cases in which the courts deny 
corporations some of the rights that natural individuals have are not 
uncommon.301 Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court 
established that there are distinctions between natural people and 
corporations, holding in Hale v. Henkel that the Fifth Amendment gives 
personal privileges to witnesses that corporations cannot invoke.302 More 
recently, some Justices specifically emphasized the point that the law 
does not always have to treat corporations identically to natural 
persons.303 
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Today, it is well established that corporations or other forms of 
artificial entities should not receive protection under the Fifth 
Amendment.304 The fact that corporations do not receive Fifth 
Amendment protection suggests that they also should not benefit from 
the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment. Given the parallels between the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments—indeed, multiple Supreme Court Justices 
have mentioned these provisions’ “intimate relation[ship]” and the fact 
that they almost run into one another305—it would be a strange outcome 
to have one apply when the other does not. A serious consideration in this 
context is also that courts should potentially not apply Fourth 
Amendment rights to corporations because courts cannot incarcerate 
corporations, which a number of scholars believe is a crucial 
distinction.306  
While the Court did not establish the existence of the possibility of 
incarceration as a requirement, it could have an impact on the evaluation 
of the applicability of the Fourth Amendment in various situations. 
Justice Marshall stated that the best indication of whether an offense is 
serious is the use of incarceration as a punishment.307 This suggests that 
courts should not necessarily grant the same level of constitutional 
protection when this “most powerful indication” is lacking. 
Notwithstanding the preceding argument, the Supreme Court has applied 
the Fourth Amendment to corporations and most recently explained that 
protecting the privacy interests of both employees and others associated 
with the corporation was a reason for giving corporations Fourth 
Amendment protection.308 
In early cases, the Supreme Court established that Fourth Amendment 
violations could take place against individuals as well as corporations,309 
and it applies to both criminal and civil cases.310 The Court has stated that 
a corporation “plainly has a reasonable, legitimate, and objective 
expectation of privacy within the interior of its covered buildings, and it 
is equally clear that expectation is one society is prepared to observe.”311 
The Court also pointed out that the Fourth Amendment protects 
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commercial buildings in addition to private homes because if it did not, 
this would go against the origin of the Amendment.312 The Court has 
stated that under normal circumstances, a corporation should in many 
ways be treated the same as an individual under the Fourth Amendment 
in that other than in very specific types of cases a search of private 
property that has not been consented to and is not authorized by a 
legitimate search warrant is unreasonable.313 The Supreme Court has 
made it clear that corporations are entitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection but that those safeguards may differ from those provided in a 
purely private context.314 “Today, the corporate form legitimates the 
level, rather than the existence, of many corporate constitutional 
protections.”315 Ultimately, while corporations may be entitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection, the remedies might not be the same as for 
individuals.316 While it is clear that businessmen should be able to go 
about their work in corporate settings free from unreasonable government 
entries—similar to how people have the right against such intrusions in 
private residences—317 this says very little about how a corporation 
should be able to vindicate that right if it is breached. 
B.  Applying the Exclusionary Rule to Corporations 
Because the exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth 
Amendment,318 the fact that the Fourth Amendment does apply to 
corporations need not mean that the rule should. The Court has made it 
clear that whether it should apply the rule is a different question from 
whether the government violated Fourth Amendment.319 The primary 
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful law enforcement 
activity, according to the Supreme Court.320 In fact, the Court went 
further and held that the rule’s sole purpose may be to deter future Fourth 
Amendment violations.321 Additionally, the Court specified that the need 
for deterrence is a necessary condition but not a sufficient one.322 
Therefore, even if the court could increase the level of deterrence to some 
extent, this would not automatically mean that exclusion would be 
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appropriate. Moreover, the Court has held that “[T]he exclusionary rule 
has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized 
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As with any remedial 
device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where 
its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.”323  
The Court noted in another context that white collar crime is one of 
the most serious problems confronting law enforcement and that the 
Court should scrutinize policies that would result in detrimental impacts 
on the government’s efforts to prosecute this type of crime carefully.324 
Given the fact that most corporate crimes are white collar crimes, the 
Court somewhat weighted its analysis against exclusion from the 
beginning, even though both federal and state courts have expressed some 
concern over the failure of other remedies to fully protect the rights given 
by the Fourth Amendment.325 Nevertheless, none of these past decisions 
addressed actors with the particular characteristics of corporations, 
including their greater ability to defend themselves in judicial 
proceedings.  
In Weeks, the Court went as far as to state that without the remedy of 
suppression, there is no value in the supposed protection of the Fourth 
Amendment.326 This becomes more complicated in the corporate context 
in which a court could suppress evidence for purposes of individual 
prosecutions (thus giving value to the Fourth Amendment) without 
necessarily doing so for corporate prosecutions. So even if a court adopts 
one of the earlier and stronger formulations of Fourth Amendment 
protections, such as the one in Weeks, the argument in favor of 
suppressing the evidence against a corporation is weaker than in other 
situations. More recently, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that a 
determination of the applicability of the exclusionary rule proceeds via a 
cost–benefit analysis of the specific circumstances.327 Seemingly small 
differences in fact patterns can warrant exclusion or admission, a question 
whose answer could even turn on whether one’s attorney objected to the 
evidence either during trial or pre-trial.328 The Supreme Court has made 
it clear that only appreciable deterrence would justify use of the rule.329 
The idea is that if the deterrent benefits are not clear or are minimal, then 
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the court should make an exception to the exclusionary rule.330 
Furthermore, it is not the case that simply showing deterrent value would 
require use of the exclusionary rule; rather, courts must still weigh the 
costs and benefits.331 Other scholars argue that the exclusionary rule 
should apply differently to different types of defendants.332 Corporations 
have several unique attributes that set them apart from individual 
defendants and make the use of the exclusionary rule inappropriate most 
of the time. 
Many of the concerns that prompted use of the exclusionary rule are 
not present or are significantly reduced in corporate criminal settings. For 
example, the use of “brutal means” to coerce information about evidence 
was a partial motivator for use of the rule in some cases,333 a problem that 
is highly unlikely to arise in the corporate context. Not only is there no 
“body” to brutalize in the traditional sense, but also the types of crimes 
that corporations may have committed (while potentially very damaging) 
are not the kinds that typically inflame police officers’ passions. Related 
to this lack of a corporeal form is the fact that corporations cannot be 
incarcerated; hence, some form of fine is the only possible outcome for 
corporate prosecutions. Historically, early courts rooted the exclusion of 
various types of evidence in the “jealous regard for the liberty of the 
individual.”334 These circumstances are very different when there is no 
individual and “liberty” is not in question.  
In United States v. Janis, the evidence illegally obtained against an 
individual was excluded at the state criminal trial but was used in the 
subsequent civil tax proceeding.335 The court felt that the deterrence 
achieved by exclusion from the criminal trial was sufficient, while 
exclusion from the civil proceeding was not necessary.336 This parallels 
the argument that this Article made above that a court could exclude 
illegally obtained evidence from individual prosecutions (those that may 
result in incarceration) but allow it in corporate prosecutions, the latter of 
which could only result in monetary fines or their equivalent.337 Often, 
the more dramatic or serious the offense, the more likely police officers 
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are to adhere to constitutional rules and avoid exclusion.338 Hence, it is 
not clear what additional deterrence occurs if the corporation could be 
convicted because it seems likely that officers would still want 
individuals to go to jail, and such officers would therefore experience a 
level of deterrence from actions that could result in exclusion and failed 
convictions of individuals. Because courts are supposed to use a cost–
benefit analysis in this area, pursuing corporations in that manner is likely 
appropriate on balance.  
Scholars point out that the exclusionary rule usually protects relatively 
powerless defendants.339 Corporations, however, are typically not 
powerless. A possible example of corporate power is the fact that in the 
fifty years following the establishment of corporations’ rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, parties used less than one-half of one percent of 
all Fourteenth Amendment litigation to seek protection for African 
Americans (who were supposed to be important beneficiaries of the 
amendment), while more than fifty percent of this type of litigation dealt 
with the protection of corporations.340   
It is also possible and even probable that police officers behave 
differently toward individuals depending on how likely specific 
individuals are to seek recourse.341 Therefore, because corporations have 
significant resources to pursue other remedies, police officers would 
already be less likely to violate their rights. A challenge faced by those 
who pursue damages awards is the difficulty of finding and paying for an 
attorney,342 which is generally much easier for a corporation. Other 
remedies may be more available to corporations as well, such as 
injunctions against the agencies that violated the law. This remedy is 
ultimately slight because the entity seeking the injunction has to show the 
likelihood of future injuries due to the illegal practice, and this is often 
difficult for a plaintiff to accomplish.343 At the same time, corporations 
would be far more likely to be able to show this than would individuals, 
so this alternative may be more feasible in the corporate context. 
Corporations can show future injuries in multiple ways. For example, a 
police search of a corporation’s premises will almost certainly disrupt 
business activities and cause a loss of productivity as well as possible 
reputational harm, which may translate to lost stock value.  
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Another example of corporations’ increased power is their level of 
political connections. Scholars ask the question: “Are today’s politicians 
more likely to impose effective ‘direct sanctions’ against the police than 
the politicians of yesteryear?”344 When it comes to situations involving 
corporations or possibly unions, the answer to this question is likely yes. 
It is well known that corporations are heavily involved in politics and 
make financial contributions that would certainly give them an increased 
ability to affect politicians compared to the typical criminal defendant. A 
possible counterargument to corporations having more power than 
individuals is that corporations have a strong incentive to, and in fact 
often do, cooperate fully with the government during investigations.345 
Most corporate defendants plead guilty when charged with a crime.346 
Yet, the fact that corporations’ power is not absolute does not negate that 
it is increased. The increase is the relevant factor in the balancing test and 
weighs on the side of not excluding evidence. 
Another basis for not excluding evidence in corporate prosecutions 
are the multiple ways that the level of harm tends to be greater in those 
kinds of cases. The easiest method to see the increased harm is simply to 
understand that corporations are very inclined to continue committing 
crimes, and hence failing to stop them is more detrimental than failing to 
stop other defendants who may or may not continue committing crimes 
and hurting innocent people. Researchers have noticed a high level of 
consistency in corporate behavior, meaning that corporations tend to act 
either ethically or dubiously on a regular basis,347 and they often engage 
in the same or very similar offenses repeatedly. Some scholars even argue 
for applying a “three strikes” rule to corporations in an attempt to address 
recidivism.348 
In the same vein, when considering the harm caused, one must take 
into account the fact that the size of many corporations and their 
potentially widespread misconduct may contribute to increased harm 
when compared with the discrete behaviors of individual actors.349 
Different actions taken in remote locations within a corporation can 
combine to result in more harmful consequences than the individual 
conduct would seem to indicate. In many exclusion cases, the court deals 
with a completed crime. In corporate settings, the likelihood that the 
crime will continue is higher. Therefore, the use of evidence is more 
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likely to put an end to existing and recurring crimes for corporations, and 
thus the value of evidence is potentially larger than in many other 
settings. Correspondingly, suppressing this evidence comes at a higher 
cost in corporate scenarios. 
Another detriment to allowing corporations to use the exclusionary 
rule stems from the type of evidence needed for successful corporate 
prosecutions, which primarily relates to the so-called collective 
knowledge doctrine. The idea behind this doctrine is that there can be 
criminal liability where the court can pool together and apply any single 
piece of information that any and all employees have to the corporation 
so the court deems the corporation to know all of it, hence forming a 
single mens rea.350 This would be much more difficult to accomplish if 
Fourth Amendment violations against a single person could defeat all of 
the charges. “[I]f employee A knows one facet[,] . . . B knows another 
facet[,] . . . and C [knows] a third facet of [a crime], the bank knows them 
all.”351 If B can have the information excluded, then the government 
cannot prosecute the defendant (the bank in this example). Furthermore, 
corporations often intentionally keep information limited to discrete 
compartments.352 This would make possible prosecutions even more 
difficult. At the end of the day, a further advantage of not allowing 
exclusion is the ability to minimize possible abuse of the corporate form. 
As judges have pointed out, there are situations in which this form may 
help to insulate property and protect criminal individuals.353 If criminals 
are aware of possible increased exposure due to the corporate form, they 
may be less inclined to use or abuse the corporate form.  
The final reason for not excluding evidence in corporate settings is 
only indirectly connected to the deterrent focus of the rule and rather 
addresses the secondary question of public perception. A number of 
scholars have argued that after Leon, some began viewing the 
exclusionary rule as an evaluation of the possible moral culpability of the 
police, which served to increase the public’s confidence in the legitimacy 
of the law enforcement process.354 On the other side, however, is the issue 
of moral condemnation in relation to corporate criminal liability.355 Some 
argue that the exclusionary rule fulfills the same role in law enforcement 
settings as criminal prosecutions do in corporate settings, i.e., expressing 
condemnation.356 Erroneous fact-finding caused by the exclusion of 
reliable probative evidence may affect not only the parties to the trial but 
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also the public at large in that society could lose confidence in the court 
system. Therefore, even if the expression of condemnation is an 
important part of the role of the judiciary in this setting, this cuts both 
ways when it comes to the question of whether to maintain the 
exclusionary rule in its current form. Being able to fully express moral 
condemnation against the police may come at the cost of fully doing so 
against corporations (if evidence gets thrown out), and vice versa. Given 
the fact that four current Justices favorably mentioned abolishing the 
exclusionary rule altogether,357 the proposal in this Article may find 
favorable reception in at least some courts and eventually even the 
Supreme Court.  
C.  General Proposals to Change the Rules 
As the previous Section demonstrated, even if one concedes that the 
Fourth Amendment applies to corporations, that does not imply that the 
exclusionary rule should also apply. There are several strong arguments 
against having it apply or at least having it apply in the same way as to 
natural people. Many people thought that courts were going to completely 
abolish the rule in the 1970s when courts emphasized the deterrence 
rationale and started imposing limitations.358 Another possibility that falls 
short of total elimination of the rule and that courts have employed in 
foreign countries would be to admit all relevant evidence but then instruct 
the fact finder that depending upon the circumstances, it should receive 
more or less weight.359 It may not even be necessary to go this far in the 
corporate setting, however. Scholars have argued since at least the early 
1970s that courts should limit the rule and only apply it in clearly flagrant 
cases.360 Courts could adopt a similar understanding for the use of the 
rule in corporate criminal prosecutions today. 
There have also been other proposals for limiting the exclusionary 
rule. One possibility would be to constrain its use to situations involving 
“serious crimes,”361 but obviously this could lead to only serious 
criminals getting away and may not only highlight some of the costs 
discussed previously but also alienate public support for the rule. Some 
argue that when courts consider excluding evidence, they should take into 
account multiple factors such as the gravity of the offense relative to the 
extent of the law enforcement misconduct, the state of mind of the officer 
committing the misconduct, the location of the search (i.e., as related to 
the reasonable expectation of privacy), and the character of the defendant 
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subjected to the illegal search.362 Hence, courts can use the severity of the 
“substantive mistake” to determine if exclusion is appropriate.363  
If courts adopted this type of model for corporations, courts could still 
exclude evidence if the circumstances were extreme. Indeed, some kinds 
of searches may be acceptable as a rule, but the specifics of particular 
cases may shock the conscience to such an extent that fundamental 
fairness mandates the exclusion of evidence obtained that way.364 Some 
scholars point out that the Supreme Court is unlikely to apply the 
exclusionary rule in many contexts, except in situations that truly shock 
the conscience where there was a significant governmental incursion.365 
Courts could use this same type of analysis in the corporate criminal 
setting. The default would be that courts would admit evidence found 
during an illegally conducted search in a prosecution against the 
corporation but not admit it against any individuals, plus corporations 
could seek other remedies for the constitutional violation such as 
damages. Nonetheless, this default could be overcome if there were any 
particularly egregious actions (such as knowing or intentional 
constitutional violations, or repeated violations by a particular agency) on 
the part of the government, and exclusion would then apply.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that the exclusionary rule should not apply to 
corporations the same way that it does to natural people. The default 
should consist of having any evidence discovered in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment admitted for purposes of prosecuting corporations. 
Courts should exclude this same evidence from any prosecutions against 
individuals involved in the criminal activity, and corporations should be 
free to pursue any alternative remedies that may be available. This Article 
shows that there are significant reasons to refuse to apply the Fourth 
Amendment to corporations given that it is supposed to protect personal 
rights that are a poor fit for artificial entities. While recognizing the 
Supreme Court’s longstanding protection of corporations under the 
Fourth Amendment, this Article argues that at least the exclusionary rule 
need not apply to them. Corporations are more capable of protecting 
themselves and more likely to cause harm to others than natural persons. 
Further, because the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that application 
of the exclusionary rule is a remedial action based on a fact-specific cost–
benefit analysis and the facts about corporations weigh heavily against 
excluding evidence, the default rule should be that exclusion is 
inapplicable in the corporate setting. The quest for truth and justice 
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should be the main goals of our judicial system, and the adoption of the 
proposal in this Article accomplishes both of these goals. 
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